Ben Franklin Report: The Mark to Market Rule

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As if in direct response to Colbert's challenge to create something, anything to believe in to turn the recession around, the Financial Accounting Standards Board changed the Mark to Market rule. Unfortunately this was actually in response to intense pressure from Congress and the Banks. This lets banks revalue their toxic assets before reporting them on their books. (Which makes me wonder why this was done just after the end of the first quarter.) The banks that took on more risk than they could manage don't just get to value these assets at whatever they want, they get to value these pieces of steaming crap at whatever they think someone would pay if anyone was interested in buying a steaming pile of shit just because someone called it golden.

Of course this looks exactly like what we have been doing so far in relation to this banking fiasco. We looked at the disaster and saw that the people in charge had established a system of perverse incentives that encouraged highly risky acts and called them extremely safe because of a complete lack of regulation. Our response has been to give even more huge shit tons of cash these very same people that fucked us for fun and profit and by removing any other regulation that insists we call a spade a spade. I am finding it harder and harder to resist the urge to call for murderous mobs to converge on Wall Street.

The Wall Street response to the reduction of regulation was obvious. Though, two years ago, if you said that Dow 8,000 would be good news people either would have thought you were crazy or they would have been terrified.

In this article, John Berry tries to criticize the negative reaction to the rule change that I outlined above. But he is comparing apples to oranges when he says,

The family doesn’t have to put up money to cover the difference between the mortgage and the lower market value. Nor should the Atlanta bank have to take a big hit on its reported income because some other mortgage-backed securities owner sold in a depressed market.

He is comparing the effect on banks that have to back their lending by having 10% of that value on their balance sheets. Which of course home owners don't do. And the family that is upside down on their mortgage will have to pay that money on the mortgage that is more than the value of their home just because they bought at the wrong time.

Lots of pundits and apologists for the financial industry keep trying to accuse home owners that face loosing their residence of buying beyond their means. Through this argument they try to push some of the moral culpability for this fiasco on people who only wanted a nice house. They didn't buy above their means, they listened to the market. The market told them what they were worth. It's not their fault the market lied to them because they couldn't have understood the market. Seriously, if huge banks couldn't see this coming when they specialize in finance, then its simply irrational to accuse home buyers of wrongdoing just because the effect of their actions is to further reduce the property value of their neighbors.

Berry does make a legitimate point about the removal of reality in accounting. He asserts that the Atlanta bank he is referring to in the above quote intends to hold on to its mortgage backed securities until they mature. Meaning the bank will be getting all the money from the mortgagees. This is the family in his apples to oranges scenario who has to pay the full value of the mortgage even though the house is worth less. (But hey, at least it still provides the same amount of warmth and shelter. Its just that breakfast nook they added doesn't mean they can afford to send the kids to college.) This means that the banks assets are really worth nearly their full value because the bank will get paid what it originally bargained. So the accounting rule lets them value their assets at what they can reasonably expect to still get paid over 30 years and they can lend out more money to consumers and businesses which increases liquidity and gets the markets moving again and leads to more manufacturing, more jobs, and more spending. Everyone's happy.

Except that just brings us back to where we started last November. No one knows how many mortgages will go into arrears or how many will be devalued through the proposed new bankruptcy rules. The short of it is we don't know if the mortgage backed securities will be worth what they were originally bargained for in 30 years when they run their course. All we do know is that they will be worth less. If not become worthless.